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ABSTRACT
Two detailed public reports on the Australian Federal Government’s ClusteredAgency Information Technology Outsourcing Initiative were published recently.
By analyzing these reports and drawing on additional material from various
websites, it was possible to piece together four important lessons from the
Australian Government’s A$1.2 billion 1997-2000 IT outsourcing experience. The
lessons are: First, because of increased coordination costs, attempting to group
a number of disparate departments to achieve economies of scale in single
omnibus contracts does not work. Second, if massive change projects are to
succeed, senior management must be committed to the project, and the needs
and aspirations of all employees need to be handled fairly and sensitively. Third,
making the transition to outsourcing is hard. Even with all the expert advice at its
disposal, the Australian Government’s IT outsourcing Initiative experienced
enormous difficulties in transitioning to external service provision. Finally, cost
savings are hard to achieve and surprisingly hard to measure. Many of these
lessons were learnt before and are well documented in the literature. That they
had to be re-learnt by these new players is itself an important lesson.

Keywords: information technology outsourcing, success guidelines, Australia,
clustered-department it outsourcing, total outsourcing
Communications of AIS, Volume 5 Article 13
The Australian Federal Government’s Clustered-Agency IT Outsourcing
Experiment by P. Seddon.

2

I. INTRODUCTION
The study of what makes Information technology (IT) outsourcing successful is
one of the most important topics in IT management today. A recent survey of IT
Outsourcing practices in Australia [Cullen et al. 2001, Seddon et al. 2001] reports
that 97% of 235 large Australian organizations were outsourcing at least some of
their IT service provision.

On average, those organizations were spending

almost 30% of their IT budgets on outsourcing. Worldwide, Lacity and Willcocks
[2001] suggest that total IT outsourcing expenditure is now in excess of US$100
billion per annum, and rising. It is these huge expenditures on outsourcing that
make it so important to understand which practices work and which do not.
In the last decade, much has been learnt about the factors that affect success
with IT outsourcing. After the early reports enthusing about the benefits of IT
outsourcing at Kodak [Applegate and Montealegre 1991], General Dynamics
[Seger and McFarlan 1993], and Xerox [Davis and Applegate 1995], researchers
such as Lacity [1992], Lacity and Hirschheim [1993, 1995], Huber [1993],
Willcocks and Fitzgerald [1994], and McFarlan and Nolan [1995] began in-depth
studies of which practices work and which do not. In addition, by 1995, when
Strassman [1995] published his damning conclusion that IT outsourcing was “a
game for losers”, it was clear that outsourcing was a complex approach to IT
service provision that required careful management from both client and vendor
organizations, and did not always deliver the expected benefits.

By 1997,

Willcocks and Lacity [1998] were able to assemble a set of papers, most written
in 1995-96, from fourteen groups of researchers who had all contributed to our
understanding of what worked and what did not. Willcocks and Lacity note in
their introduction [pp.12-13] that the IT outsourcing market at that time was still
relatively immature, and that many client organizations lacked sufficient
experience to work effectively with IT outsourcing vendors.
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In the latter part of the decade the causes of success and failure became clearer
as further research was published [Ang and Straub 1998, Feeny and Willcocks
1998, Hu et al. 1997, and Lacity and Willcocks 1998], so that by the year 2000,
Lacity and Willcocks [2001] were able to offer a list of “proven practices” for IT
outsourcing success. Their “proven practices”, drawn from their detailed analysis
of 116 large IT “sourcing decisions” over the previous decade include the
following [p.xiii]:
(1) the use of a selective sourcing strategy rather than all-or-none outsourcing
strategies,
(2) identifying core IT capabilities to keep in-house (see the nine “core
capabilities” for successful IT management in Feeny and Willcocks
[1998] and Chapter 7 in Lacity and Willcocks [2001]),
(3) identifying non-core IT capabilities for potential outsourcing,
(4) conducting a rigorous evaluation of market options and supplier offerings,
(5) clearly defining IT outsourcing expectations and mitigating risk in a
contract, and
(6) implementing post-contract management processes and structures to
enable supplier success.
In addition to endorsing the relatively greater success of selective over total
outsourcing1, Sambamurthy et al. [2001, p.299] suggest that IT outsourcing is
also more likely to be successful if it is focused on activities where external
providers:
(7) supply expertise that is currently lacking,
(8) can capitalize on economies of scale, and/or
(9) take on responsibilities not considered critical to the customer
organization.
Finally, Cullen [1997] argues strongly for:

1

Lacity and Willcocks [2001, p.4] define “total outsourcing” as at least 80% of an organization’s IT
budget.
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(10) the use of regularly-renegotiated service level agreements (e.g.,
monthly) as the basis for sound ongoing management of IT outsourcing
relationships.
These “ten commandments” constitute some of the world’s best available advice
or theory about how to achieve successful outcomes from IT outsourcing.

Seemingly flying in the face of these ten commandments, in January 2001 the
Australian Federal Government completed what can best be described as a bold
four-year field experiment in total IT outsourcing.

The innovation in the

experiment involved grouping government agencies (mainly departments) into
clusters and mandating that they outsource all their IT services. The experiment
directly affected thousands of peoples’ jobs, and left the Australian government
with five five-year IT Outsourcing contracts worth a total of A$1.2 billion (approx.
US$600 million) that will affect government IT service provision for many years to
come.

The experiment began on 25 April 1997 when the then Minister for Finance, John
Fahey, announced the Government's “in-principle approval to outsource its
Information Technology (IT) infrastructure”. It ended almost four years later, on
12 January 2001, when the now Minister for Finance and Administration, John
Fahey, announced that he had accepted the recommendation of Independent
Reviewer, Richard Humphry, that:

“agencies should proceed to outsource their IT infrastructure within the
overall government policy to outsource, but should exercise their own
discretion on what should be outsourced and the manner in which that
outsourcing should take place.”
It is the second half of the above quotation that matters. By allowing heads of
government agencies to exercise their own discretion about what should be
outsourced, the Minister was in effect terminating the experiment. Because of
the difficulties government agencies and departments experienced with
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clustered-agency total IT outsourcing, it seems safe to predict that many of the
remaining Heads of agencies will now chose not to outsource all IT service
provision, if they outsource at all.
A lot of heat and anguish was generated by the events described in this paper.
The purpose of this paper is therefore to describe the experiment as accurately,
fairly, and unemotionally as possible, relying only on documented facts to draw
four important lessons. The lessons are as follows:
1. Don’t cluster. The apparent economies of scale that can be gained by
grouping agencies into clusters are overwhelmed by the increased
coordination costs required to manage the clusters. This lesson is
particularly true for total outsourcing, which involves a myriad of IT
services.
2. Gaining commitment of all participants is essential.

If massive

change projects are to succeed, senior management must be
committed to the project, and the needs and aspirations of all
employees need to be handled fairly and sensitively. Minister Fahey’s
1997 media statement says

“A significant majority of the 2800 employees currently working
in mainframe, mid-range and desktop areas will be able to
enhance their career opportunities by transferring to the private
sector suppliers.”

Transfer rates of 70-80% of employees were expected. In practice,
transfer rates for the three clusters reviewed in this paper were more
like 30-40%. Many employees took their severance pay and either
found other jobs or retired. This low transfer rate resulted in enormous
loss of organizational knowledge, particularly of legacy systems.
3. Making the transition to total outsourcing is hard. “The
experience of Cluster 3 and Group 5 highlighted that both agencies
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and

tenderers

underestimated

the

complexity

involved

in

simultaneously transitioning to an outsourced provider the delivery
of IT infrastructure services to a number of agencies.” [ANAO 2000,
para 8.5]
4. Cost savings through outsourcing are surprisingly hard to
measure and may be unattainable. Although the 1997-98 federal
budget talks of cost savings of $100M p.a., representing 15% of the
government’s total IT expenditure, cost savings are actually very hard
to achieve. It seems likely that three out of four tenders discussed in
this paper will not achieve cost savings.

The above lessons were learnt at considerable cost. If the government had
known in 1997 what it knows now, it is fair to say that it would have not have
embarked on the experiment described in this paper.

II. THE WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT IT OUTSOURCING INITIATIVE
Consistent with its strongly-held ideological belief that privatization is good, and
with the example of numerous other governments’ IT outsourcing initiatives
around the world2, the Australian Federal Government’s IT Outsourcing Initiative
began with the laudable objectives of saving costs, improving service, and
enhancing industry development throughout Australia3. One year after taking
office from the previous federal Labor government4, Minister Fahey’s 25 April
1997 media release captures the essence of the plan:

2

The 27-page February 1998 edition of the US-government-backed OIS Newsletter (Ronen and
Mathews 1998) provides a contemporary glimpse of worldwide English-speaking government
views on IT outsourcing in late 1997. Available online at
http://policyworks.gov/intergov/ois.newsletter.feb.pdf, it contains sixteen one-to-two-page articles
about government IT outsourcing projects in the US, UK, Canada, Singapore and Australia. OMB
Circular A-76 (Office of the [US] President 1983) mentioned in a number of the US-authored
articles is available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a076.pdf
3
A full list of objectives is presented in the Office of Asset Sales and IT Outsourcing (OASITO)
Annual Report 1998/99 (1999, pp.30-31). It also appears in the above-mentioned OIS
Newsletter, page 4.
4
The privatization-minded Howard Government was elected into office on 4 March, 1996.
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“This initiative will build on the experiences of other governments and
private sector organisations, here and internationally, who have
already successfully outsourced.

“The Government is committed to achieving the best value for its
information technology dollar, to support the delivery of services at the
lowest cost to the taxpayer.

“This initiative creates substantial opportunities for small to mediumsized Australian enterprises. Partnering arrangements with vendors will
be encouraged. This will enhance the international competitiveness of
local companies through the opportunities created to work with leading
edge outsourcers. Small to medium enterprises are also expected to
fulfil a significant role in the provision of regional support services
which will still be required under outsourcing, particularly for desktop
services”

To gain full advantages from economies of scale, a number of large and small
government agencies (e.g., two large and four small departments) were to be
formed into clusters that were to purchase all their IT services from a single
prime contractor. A total of eleven clusters or groups were to be formed. The
initial plan was that all eleven contracts would be in place by June 1999 [ANAO
2000 para 16]. According to the 1997-98 budget [Costello, May 1997], the plan
was expected to save A$100 million per annum, or 15% of the government’s
1997 annual IT expenditure, from the year 20005.

Three and a half years and an enormous amount of effort later, by December
2000, five of the eleven Group contracts had been let, one tender had been
5

In anticipation of cost savings, reductions were made to the forward estimates of IT expenses
for Budget-funded agencies in the 1997-98 Budget. “The reductions totalled $37.9 million in 1998-
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withdrawn due to failure to attract a bid offering sufficient cost savings
(DEETYA&CN), two more current tenders were due to be finalized in 2001, and
the remainder were in the pipeline. Details of the contracts let and tenders under
consideration at the end of 2000 are summarized in Table 1. As shown in the
bottom row of Table 1, the total value of the five five-year contracts already let
was A$1,221 million. Total expected cost savings over the lives of the contracts
were A$264 million [Humphry 2000, Appendix 2].
Table 1. Status of the Groups under the IT Outsourcing Initiative,
December 2000
Group/
Cluster Agencies Status
Completed Contracts
2
3 large
Completed contract
Health
signed 6 Dec.1999.
agencies Handover of services at
various dates.
3
7 (3 large Completed contract
4 small)
signed 31 March 1998
Handover of services on
1 July 1998
4
1 (Aust
Completed contract
Tax
signed 31 March 1999
Office)
Handover of services on
23 June 1999
5

5

8

7

Contractor
(duration)
IBM GSA
(5 years)

Contract Savings No. of
Estimate Desktop
Value
s
Scope of IT Infrastructure
*$m
$m
$

351 $

54

8,000

CSC Aust.
$
Pty Ltd
(IT: 5 years;
Data: 2 yrs)
EDS
$
Australia
(IT: 5 years
Carriage:2yr
s)
Completed contract
Advantra Pty $
signed on 14 April 1999. Ltd.
Handover of services on (5 years)
1 July 1999
Completed contract
Ipex ITG
$
signed on 9 March 2000. (5 years)
Handover of services on
26 June 2000

160 $

60

5,200

490 $ 100

Nature of
contract

Mainframe of 1,300 MIPS,
Three
Midrange, desktop, data
separate
comms and cross platform
contracts
services
Mainframe, midrange, desktop, Single 5and voice services over a five year
year period
contract

18,000

Mainframe of 900 MIPS,
Midrange, desktop, data &
voice comms, cross platform
services

Single 5year
contract

90 $

10

4,000

No Mainframe, included
Midrange, desktop, data
comms, and other services

Single 5year
contract

130 $

40

7,500

No Mainframe, included
Midrange, desktop, data &
voice comms, 100 research
systems

Single 5year
contract

Mainframe of 5,000 MIPS.
Midrange, desktop, data
comms and cross platform
services.
Mainframe of 1,100 MIPS,
Midrange, desktop, data and
voice comms and other
services

Anticipate
d separate
contracts

Discontinued Tenders
?
2
Discontinued 11 June
(DEETYA 1998 in the absence of
& CN)
competitive tenders.
Current Tenders
1
2

11

A$ Total

5

Currently in the market
place. Tenders closed
Dec ’99. Evaluation
underway
RFT released
September ’00 – Tenders
close 31 January 2001

-

-

30,000

-

-

8,000

$

1,221 $

264

(Sources: Humphry Report [2000], Appendix 2, pp.45-49; ANAO [2000], Figure 1.2, p.45.)

99, $87 million in 1999-00, and on-going annual reductions in agency budgets of $99.2 million
from 2000-01.” (ANAO 2000 para 5).
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Because all participants in the contracting process are bound by confidentiality
agreements, very little public information was available until recently to enable
detailed independent assessment of the value of the Whole-of-Government IT
Outsourcing Initiative.

However, in September 2000, the Australian National

Audit Office (ANAO) published a detailed 243-page performance evaluation of
the effectiveness of the Initiative [ANAO 2000]. In a highly political environment,
this carefully-written report, which is available on the web, is the primary source
of detailed information for this paper. Prepared at a cost of A$535,000 [ANAO
2000, paragraph 1.25, page 49], the Auditor-General’s report focuses on the
effectiveness of the Group 3, 4, and 5 contracts. It provides a rich source of data
for understanding the evaluation, implementation, and outcomes-to-date of these
three contracts. In addition, the report contains comments from the three
Contract Management Offices responsible for the Group 3, 4, and 5 contracts,
the Office for Asset Sales and IT Outsourcing (OASITO) -- the agency
responsible for managing the overall Initiative -service providers.

and a number of external

These comments help the reader form a balanced

assessment of the success of the government’s IT Outsourcing Initiative.
Towards the end of the year 2000, internal reports, tabling of the above ANAO
report in Parliament, and rumblings of protest from the community6 evidently
raised enough concerns to prompt Minister Fahey to commission an Independent
Review of the government’s IT Outsourcing Initiative. The person he chose to
head the Review was Richard Humphry. Humphry was a significant choice, since
he

had

been

a

member

of

the

1997

Information

Technology

and

Telecommunication Policy Advisory Committee that had recommended the IT
Outsourcing Initiative to the government in the first place [Humphry 2000, p.22].
Terms of reference for the Independent Review were published on 14 November,
2000. The report was due in six weeks. On 12 January, 2001, the 108-page

6

Awkward questions were being asked in parliament by the opposition spokesperson on
outsourcing, Kate Lundy. In addition, employees of the government scientific research
organization, CSIRO, a member of Group 9, organized a number of public demonstrations in the
streets of Sydney as part of their attempts to prevent outsourcing of their IT.
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Humphrey Report [2000] was released. That report, which is also available on
the web, is the second key source of detailed information for this paper.

In essence, the Humphry report recommended that the government’s mandated
clustered-agency, whole-of-government IT Outsourcing approach should be
terminated. In its place, he recommended that rights for deciding what gets
outsourced, if anything, should be devolved to heads of departments and other
agencies. With regard to tenders (not contracts) already underway (i.e., Groups
1, 11, 9, and 10), Humphrey recommended that control and direction of
evaluations of those tenders should pass immediately from OASITO to the heads
of the affected departments7.

These recommendations were the result of a

courageous and radical shift in his thinking. Explaining why he shifted from his
1997 position, Humphry [2000, p.6] says he has learnt that:

“IT outsourcing is at its heart about the management of human resources
and cultural change, of which technology is an important but not dominant
element.”
In releasing the Humphry Report, Minister Fahey said he had accepted all ten of
Humphry’s recommendations [Fahey 2001]. His announcement marked the end
of the Australian Federal Government’s Clustered-agency IT Outsourcing
Experiment. The government’s new policy now allows Heads of agencies to
follow the ten commandments presented in the Introduction should they so
choose.

7

Humphry is silent about Groups other than 1, 11, 9, and 10, but it seems safe to assume that
the remaining groups will be given similar options.
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III. LESSONS LEARNT ABOUT CLUSTERED-AGENCY IT
OUTSOURCING
LESSON 1: DON’T CLUSTER.
The idea for clustering seems to have come from the outsourcing vendors in the
mid-1990s. A 1995 report by the Minister for Finance's Information Technology
Review Group [1995] notes that IBM recommended that the government should
consolidate data centers to achieve cost savings.

“IBM Limited had estimated savings from increased outsourcing of
government information technology services to be in the range of $1 billion
over the subsequent five or six years, based on a net benefit of 20
percent.”

“although a number of Commonwealth agencies were already at, or close
to, an economic size in terms of data centres, there were a number of
smaller sites which could be consolidated. The report recommended that
the consolidation of infrastructure be considered by aggregating like
agencies on the basis of business type.” [ANAO 2000, para 2.27]

Whilst consolidation of data centers may result in economies of scale, and
therefore make sense, it does not follow that consolidation of all IT service
provision makes sense. However, in late 1995 the South Australian government
had outsourced all its IT service provision to a single vendor [EDS 2000], and
that, combined with the germ of the idea planted by IBM, the newly-elected
government’s ideological commitment to privatization, and the many IT
outsourcing success stories circulating around the world at that time, seems to
have guided the thinking of the key decision makers. In any event, by 1997 the
Department of Finance’s IT Advisory Committee was recommending a clustered-
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agency approach to IT outsourcing not just for data centers, but for all IT
services:

“responses from vendors had indicated that the outsourcing of IT services
in multi-agency clusters would result in significant financial savings
compared with separate outsourcing activities by individual agencies.”
[ANAO 2000 para 2.28]
Clustering was expected to produce significant benefits including:

“financial savings in ESP [external service provider] charges; reduced
tender costs to Government and industry; increased opportunities for
rationalisation and standardisation between agencies; and efficiency in
contract management.” [ANAO 2000, para 3].

However, experience now shows that any economies of scale attainable through
clustering were more than offset by the increased coordination costs required to
manage heterogeneous IT service provision through clusters8.

Repeatedly

throughout the Auditor-General’s report there are references to difficulties
encountered as a result of the decision to outsource IT via clusters of agencies.
The following quotation from the Auditor-General summarizes the issues9:

“8.4 An issue which has been highlighted by the experience gained to date is
the significant additional complexity involved for both parties in managing the
delivery of services to a group of agencies.179 The multi-agency groups,
Cluster 3 and Group 5, have experienced, to varying degrees, considerably
8

If they were not more than offset, the experiment would not have been abandoned.
In the quotation, “ATO” refers to the Australian Tax Office, the single department that constitutes
Group 4. The ESP for the ATO is EDS Australia. The sentence in bold is emphasized in the original.
Footnote 179 referenced in the quotation says: “In June 1999, IP Australia reported that clustering in
an IT outsourcing initiative had proved to be more complex and difficult for both the ESP and Cluster
members than had been imagined.”

9
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more disruption to service delivery than has the single agency group, ATO,
with significant shortfalls in the provision of contracted service levels during
the first year of the Agreements. The ATO ESP advised ANAO in August
2000 that: ‘It [has] been our general experience that working with single
agency groups has been more effective and presented less difficulties
at all stages of the procurement.’

“8.5 The experience of Cluster 3 and Group 5 highlighted that both
agencies and tenderers underestimated the complexity involved in
simultaneously transitioning to an outsourced provider the delivery of IT
infrastructure services to a number of agencies.”[ANAO 2000, paras 8.4
and 8.5]
In short, the attempt to gain economies of scale by clustering government agencies
seems to have caused coordination costs to rise so much that service levels fell, and
overall IT service-provision costs rose, not fell.

For the future, agencies within

existing multi-agency single contracts (Groups 3, 5, and 8) will have to work within or
renegotiate those contracts. But for those agencies not yet committed to contracts,
Humphry’s recommendations (that agency heads should exercise their own
discretion on what should be outsourced and the manner in which that outsourcing
takes place) probably mean that clustering is over. It is risky to generalize from just
two contracts (Cluster 3 and Group 5), but it seems likely that the Australian
experiment discovered an important caveat for the “outsource when you can gain
economies of scale” commandment (commandment 8 in the Introduction):
clustering disparate user organizations to achieve economies of scale in total IT
service provision does not work. Clustering may work for simple services, such as
electrical power, shared services, or accounts payable, but not for such complex
services as whole-of-agency IT.
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LESSON 2: GAINING COMMITMENT OF ALL PARTICIPANTS IS ESSENTIAL
The key lesson that Independent reviewer Humphry seems to have learnt from the
four-year Initiative is that it is imperative to gain commitment from the majority of the
people involved:

“Fundamental to an understanding of transition is that it is not merely a
technology issue. The implementation project at its heart is about the
management of human resources and cultural change, of which technology is
an important but not dominant element.” [Humphry 2000, p.11]
Commitment matters in at least two ways. First, the government failed to achieve
commitment to the project from senior management in its various agencies.
Second, the government’s decision to outsource IT created a host of human
resources (HR) problems for the agencies’ IT staff, the agencies themselves, and
the vendors. Both factors appear to have been equally important.

With respect to senior management’s lack of enthusiasm for the Initiative, the
government’s solution was to impose outsourcing on them from above through the
Office for Asset Sales and IT Outsourcing (OASITO). To reinforce the message, in
December 1998, eighteen months into the Initiative, Prime Minister, John Howard,
issued the following edict:

“as a general Government policy, outsourcing of IT infrastructure services
should proceed unless there is a compelling business case on a whole-ofGovernment basis for not doing so”. [Australian National Audit Office
(ANAO) 2000, paragraph 8]
But pressure from above did not make senior management any more willing to
cooperate. As Humphry [2000] reports:
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“There has been a general lack of buy-in by senior management and an
unwillingness to accept that the Initiative is the most appropriate approach
to IT outsourcing. This lack of buy-in is by far the most significant risk
factor for implementation management. The lack of acceptance by
agencies has presented the Initiative with difficulties at every stage.
[Humphry 2000, p.11]
With respect to human resource (HR) issues, outsourcing created the usual set
of problems for employees, vendors, and clients (the government agencies).
From the individual employees’ points of view, the whole experience was very
unsettling. Did they want to work for the outsourcing vendor? Should they look
for a job elsewhere? Were redundancy payments available? If so, when, and for
how much? From the agencies’ points of view, if employees chose not to accept
positions with the vendor there was a distinct risk of loss of organizational
knowledge that would make transition to the new arrangement difficult.

But

agency management also felt a duty of care to their staff that motivated them to
offer large redundancy payments to their IT staff. From the vendors’ points of
view, managers were no doubt reluctant to hire “dead wood”, but equally they
needed to hire sufficient staff to maintain and run the government’s systems,
particularly its legacy systems. If hired, how much should the new employees be
paid? What were their leave entitlements, retirement benefits, etc.?

These

problems are not new, but the details of how the government and its advisors
sought to solve them in this late-1990s outsourcing initiative provide some
valuable lessons for potential future outsourcing initiatives by other organizations.

The government’s decisions with regard to these HR issues are described in
detail at the OASITO website [OASITO date unknown].

Basically, the

government decided to give agencies the choice between what was called a
Clean Break or a Phased approach to staff transition, with the proviso that all
agencies in a cluster must adopt the same approach. Under the Clean Break
approach, the entire cluster’s IT employees were to be made redundant. This
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entitled them to a severance payment of two weeks pay for each year of service,
up to a maximum payment of 48 weeks (24 years of service). Employees could
then choose to accept a job with the vendor, or not, as it suited them. Under the
Phased approach, the successful tenderer was required to meet its additional
staffing requirements initially from agency staff. In each of the three Groups
studied by the Auditor-General, the Clean Break approach was adopted by the
affected agencies. Factors influencing agencies’ decisions included “precedents
within the Commonwealth, existing industrial agreements within agencies and
informal advice on staff preferences.” [ANAO 2000 para 8.33].

Under this

approach, government IT staff had the option of accepting voluntary redundancy
or applying for redeployment to other jobs or agencies.
In the event, having been made redundant, many former Group 3, 4, and 5
agency employees took their severance pay and either found other jobs or
retired10. Failure of Group 3, 4, and 5 IT staff to seek positions with vendors
resulted in enormous loss of organizational knowledge:

“The number of existing agency staff that took up positions with the
Cluster 3, ATO and Group 5 ESPs was considerably below that which
agencies had considered desirable in order to maintain continuity and the
transfer of knowledge of agency infrastructure. In most cases, the
estimated level of transfer represented about one-third of in-scope
positions. In the context of the risk assessment conducted as part of the
tender process, ATO had said that it was important that at least 70 to 80
percent of staff transferred to the successful tenderer. In a number of
agencies, the low levels of staff transfer contributed to operational
difficulties following handover due to the loss of corporate knowledge and

10

By contrast, for the Health cluster, Group 2, “More than 80% of former in-scope staff members
of the Health Group Agencies elected to accept positions offered by IBM GSA or its
subcontractors.” (OASITO 2000, p.24). It is not known why the take-up rate was different for this
cluster.
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technical skills, especially in the operation of legacy systems.

[ANAO

2000 para 8.47]
These concerns about the impact of the government’s staffing policy are
endorsed by at least one service provider, in this case, CSC Australia. In an
August 2000 comment on the proposed ANOA report, the Cluster 3 ESP says:

‘The exercising of the Clean Break approach for existing staff by agencies
is a further major issue in achievement of a timely, cost-effective, proper
transition. Given the disparate nature of the business of agencies in
Cluster 3, [it] does not understand the logic of all agencies having to
exercise the same option and considers this to have had a detrimental
effect upon both agencies and [itself].’ [ANAO 2000 p.191, footnote 193]
Clearly, participant commitment was lacking in the government’s IT Outsourcing
Initiative. Senior agency management did not back the Initiative, which probably
doomed it from the start. In addition, the government’s high-handed approach to
the Initiative appears to have caused many of its former IT employees to look for
other employment or retire. This outcome resulted in a loss of organizational
knowledge that must have caused great difficulties for the outsourcing vendors.

LESSON 3: MAKING THE TRANSITION TO TOTAL OUTSOURCING IS HARD.
As noted earlier, by 1997 the world knew a lot about IT outsourcing. To ensure
success, the government paid top dollar for the best advice. It employed US law
firm Shaw Pittman for strategic advice and contract negotiation11. The
government also chose to work with the world’s most experienced outsourcing
vendors (including IBM GSA, CSC, and EDS). Given all this access to highpowered knowledge and experience, the process of transitioning from internal to
11

By 31 May 2000, Shaw Pittman had been paid a total of $17M (60% of all consulting fees for
the Initiative) for its advice. Individual partner-level fees to Shaw Pittman were extraordinarily
high: US$85,000 per month (ANAO 2000, paras 3.4 to 3.19, and footnote 44, p.53).
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external service provision should have been expected to run reasonably
smoothly.

Yet the transition was not smooth. The Auditor-General’s report is replete with
details of difficulties encountered by all three Groups in thrashing out contracts,
defining service levels, measuring service levels, managing external service
providers, providing appropriately-substantiated invoices, agreeing on credits for
failure to meet agreed service levels, and resolving disagreements over disputed
invoices. In some cases, service levels dropped significantly:

“In August 1999, the Group 5 Management Committee advised the ESP
that the service difficulties represented a significant erosion over the
services delivered in agencies prior to handover. Although acknowledging
that the ESP was attempting to fix the problems, the Group wished to put
on record that the service problems were having a real and significant
impact on business in Group 5 agencies, and seriously affecting
productivity.” [ANAO 2000 para 8.12]
In other cases, problems emerged with procedural matters such as invoicing and
failure to deliver promised performance reviews. For example:

“As at June 2000, the ATO had yet to pay telecommunications invoices for
the first year of the Agreement.” [ANAO 2000 para 8.53]

The Auditor-General sums up the extent of difficulties experienced by the
agencies in moving to external service provision as follows (Cluster 3 is Group 3
and the ATO is Group 4):

“34. The initial contract management effort required in respect of the
Cluster 3, ATO and Group 5 Agreements has exceeded the expectations
of many agencies, with the increased management effort and transaction
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costs occurring at both the operational and senior executive levels. Many
of these latter costs resulted from the need for senior management to
focus on the delivery of the relevant services to an extent not previously
experienced in order to address initial service delivery problems. These
transaction costs are not fully captured in the overall reported costs of
managing the Agreements.

35. A stabilisation period can be expected following outsourcing, but it has
taken longer than expected to obtain the anticipated level of cost and
performance visibility and, in some areas, to achieve contracted levels of
service. The experience of Cluster 3 and Group 5 highlighted that both
agencies and tenderers underestimated the complexity involved in
simultaneously transitioning to an outsourced provider the delivery of IT
infrastructure services to a number of agencies.” [ANAO 2000, paragraphs
34 and 35]
Confirming these difficulties of transition, Cluster 3 vendor, CSC Australia, is
reported as saying:

“[It] believes that the complexity and length of transition was seriously
underestimated. This factor is a significant contributor to any perceived
shortcomings in a strictly literal interpretation of performance and the
Agreement. It is simply not practical for a central agency like OASITO to
determine realistic and appropriate parameters for a disparate group of
operating agencies. The sound understanding required by both sides
cannot be externally determined and needs to remain a matter of flexibility
and negotiation under operating circumstances.” [ANAO 2000, para 8.45]

Finally, Independent Reviewer Humphrey also comments on transition problems:
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“There has been a lack of focus on the managerial and operational
aspects of implementation by OASITO, for the sake of settling legal and
contractual arrangements according to an ambitious timetable. Similarly,
there have been concerns that some agencies lacked sufficient in-house
expertise to manage transitional arrangements. The time taken for some
contracts has been significantly longer than anticipated (Appendix 6).
While the time taken for Request for Tender (RFT) and contract
development has been extensive, the time taken to build essential
ESP/agency

relationships

before

entering

into

the

contractual

arrangements has been less than adequate. This has magnified the
transition risks and multiplied the amount of management effort required
by both customer and ESP to overcome transition and service delivery
hurdles.” [Humphry 2000, p.11]

In short, making the transition from internal to external IT service provision is
hard, particularly in total outsourcing deals such as these. Again, this is not a
new lesson. Every organization that outsourced had to deal with transition
problems. What is surprising is that even with access to so much expert advice
on ways of handling the transition, both the government and vendor firms found
these particular transitions so difficult.

Some of the difficulties were clearly

exacerbated by clustering and lack-of-commitment problems mentioned in
Lessons 1 and 2 above, but the extent of difficulties was still much greater than
anyone expected.
LESSON
4:
COST
SAVINGS
THROUGH
OUTSOURCING
SURPRISINGLY HARD TO MEASURE AND MAY BE UNATTAINABLE

ARE

One of the government’s primary objectives for IT Outsourcing Initiative was to
save costs.

Actually achieving cost savings proved to be harder than the

government expected, and even knowing if they have been achieved or not is
surprisingly difficult. It is rare to see audited details of cost savings discussed in
public, which is why it is worth examining them now.
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Estimated non-discounted12 cost savings for the three contracts analyzed in the
Auditor-General’s report, i.e., for agency Groups 3, 4, and 5, are shown in
Table 2. Baseline “estimated future costs from continued in-house operations”
[OASITO 2000, page 21] are shown in row 1. OASITO estimates of cost savings
at the time the tender documents were accepted are shown row 2. OASITO, of
course, would have been under gentle political pressure to make these savings
appear as high as possible. In particular, OASITA would have been conscious of
the government’s 1997 budget forecast of 15% cost savings [Costello 1997].
Table 2. Estimated Non-Discounted Anticipated Cost Savings from IT
Outsourcing for Groups 3, 4 and 5 at the time of selection of preferred tenderer

1 Original five-year baseline cost
2 OASITO’s estimated cost savings at time
of selection of preferred tenderer
3 Auditor-General’s estimated cost savings
at time of selection of preferred tenderer
4 Auditor-General’s cost savings as a
percentage of the baseline costs
5 Less OASITO tender evaluation costs
6 Final cost estimated savings to the Groups
at time of selection of preferred tenderer

Group 3
1997-98
$220M
$60M

Group 4
1998-99
$590M
$100M

$61M

$29M

-$7M

28%

5%

-7%

3%
25%

3%
2%

Group 5
1998-99
$100M
$10M

3%
-10%

DEETYA &
CN
Tender
discontinued
on 11 June
1998 due to
absence of
costcompetitive
tenders.

Sources: ANAO [2000], paras. 6, 24, and Figure 1, page 19; Humphry [2000], Appendix 2;
OASITO 1999]

Comparable estimates of cost savings from the more independent-minded
Auditor-General are in row 3. OASITO and the Auditor-General disagree about
how values of end-of-period assets should be treated, competitive-neutrality
adjustments13, and on the use of discounting of future cash flows. Since contract

12

Because the contracts run for five years, the ANAO report argues that costs should be
discounted at 8%p.a.
13
Competitive-neutrality adjustments adjust reported savings to compensate for the fact that
private outsourcing vendors are entitled to a return on capital and pay taxes that government
departments do not pay. OASITO’s estimate for Group 3 is before competitively-neutrality
adjustments. Its estimates for Groups 4 and 5 are post competitively-neutrality adjustments.
(Phone call to Auditor-General’s office, 12 Feb 2001). OASITO’s figures before competitive
neutrality adjustment for Groups 4 and 5 would appear to have been $60M and $1M respectively
(ANAO 2000, Figure 1). The position taken in this paper is that return on vendor capital is a real
cost of outsourcing that should not be ignored in computing cost savings. So the Auditor-
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values are normally reported in the press in terms of the total non-discounted
payments over the lives of the contracts, only non-discounted figures are
reported in Table 2.
The estimated cost savings in rows 2 and 3 do not reflect costs in agency senior
management time for managing the transition or the costs incurred by OASITO in
managing the tendering process. No data are available on senior management
opportunity costs, but the costs incurred by OASITO appear to be about 3% of
the value of contracts issued [ANAO 2000, para 19]. Using the Auditor-General’s
non-discounted figures and subtracting 3% for OASITO’s costs, some crude
estimates of expected cost savings at the times of contract approval are shown in
row 6 of Table 2. Based on the figures in Table 2, the Group 3 contract looks like
a winner, but Groups 4 and 5 are marginal propositions. Since the DEETYA14
tender was cancelled due to lack of competitive tenders, it appears that even at
the time of tender evaluation, three of four tenders were not likely to produce
significant cost savings.

Evidently it is not as easy to achieve cost savings

through IT outsourcing as the government had been led to believe.
Table 2 is all about expected cost savings. Once the contract is underway,
conditions change and it becomes increasingly difficult to define, let alone
measure, realized cost savings. As illustrated in the following comment from
Group 3 service provider, CSC, if baseline service requirements have changed, it
makes no sense at all to compare cost savings to the original tender document
costs:

“Given the complex and diverse nature of the infrastructure inherited by
[us], and the large differences in agency businesses, [we] consider that
the progress in replacement of substandard infrastructure, additional
capacity, network and facilities and the remediation work undertaken for
General’s cost savings estimates before competitive-neutrality adjustments are reported in Table
2.
14
Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs
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Y2K are significant achievements. Undertaking this work, in close
consultation with Cluster 3 agencies to meet their business needs, had a
higher priority than some other elements of the Agreement and were
undertaken at substantial cost to [us].

“Unplanned activities ranging through a Federal Election, a Referendum
and refugee and humanitarian relief exercises, also added to the volume
and complexity of work. [We] believe it unrealistic to simply measure
performance against a contract document written some time ago, rather
than the living reality of its clients' – and Government's – dynamics.”
[ANAO 2000, para 8.26, p.187]

Despite the measurement difficulties, the Government had framed its decision to
outsource in terms of cost savings, so the question will always be asked: “Did the
contract result in cost savings?”

At the time of publication of the Auditor-

General’s report only one estimate of actual cost saving was available. The
Cluster 3 contract management office (CMO), the cluster shown in Table 2 as the
most likely to yield cost savings, had attempted to estimate cost savings for the
first year of the Agreement, 1998-99 [ANAO 2000 paras 8.50-51]. Its estimates
are discussed below. At the time of publication of the Auditor-General’s report
Cluster 4 was still awaiting data for estimating its first-year cost savings, and
Cluster 5 had decided that “the process of measuring cost savings is unreliable”
and “will not assist (and may distort) appropriate decision-making by contract
managers and government” [ANAO 2000 paras 8.53-54]. A cynic might wonder
if Cluster 5 management had some inkling of an outcome the government might
prefer not to have quantified.
With respect to the only available estimate of realized cost savings, the AuditorGeneral says:
“8.50 The Cluster 3 MC advised ANAO that, in its view, substantial
outcomes had been achieved for the Commonwealth under the Cluster 3
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Agreement at a cost which, on the available evidence, was consistent with
the contract and lower than the internal costs the Commonwealth would
have had to incur for similar services. The Cluster 3 CMO estimated the
savings realised in the first year of its Agreement by comparing the service
charges and direct contract management costs incurred with the agency
cost baseline used in the tender evaluation, which it normalised to reflect
the actual volumes consumed during 1998-99.

8.51 The Cluster 3 CMO identified savings of $5.8 million, or 12 percent of
the normalised agency baseline.196 This was about 80 percent of the rate
of first year savings forecast in the tender evaluation for the agencies
considered in the Cluster 3 CMO's analysis. Relevant agencies were
expected to accrue savings of 15 percent of the agency cost baseline
($6.4 million) in the first year for the equivalent costs (see Figure 8.1).197
Savings were identified for all but one agency, but at a generally lower
rate than expected.198 [ANAO 2000 paras 8.50 and 8.51]15
Footnotes 197 and 198 in paragraph 8.51 (above) are reproduced in
footnote 15 to illustrate some of the difficulties associated with defining what
should be measured to estimate cost savings.

Figure 8.1 referenced in

15

Footnotes 197 and 198 in para 8.51 are as follows:
The savings model used in the tender evaluation to project first year savings included estimated
voluntary redundancy (VR) payments and the payment to agencies by the ESP for existing
equipment. The Cluster 3 CMO's analysis did not include these costs in either the normalised
baseline or service charges considered. Taking those costs into consideration, the tender
evaluation projected savings for the first year of the Agreement of 23 percent ($9.88m) for the
agencies considered by the CMO. Including the equivalent items in the CMO's savings analysis
results in first year savings realised across the Cluster of 13 percent of the normalised agency
baseline ($6.7 million). A significant factor in the variance from expected savings is that actual
DIMA VR payments were 3.5 times the $1 million estimate used in the evaluation.
198
IP Australia was projected to accrue savings of $220,000 (34 percent) in year one, but realised
a cost premium of $209,000 (24 percent) over the normalised baseline. This was primarily due to
an error in the tender evaluation which understated mainframe costs under outsourcing. IP
Australia represents less than 3 percent of projected mainframe service charges over the term.
Identified savings for AEC were greater than anticipated, partly due to a delay in the rollout of its
desktop upgrade.
197
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paragraph 8.51 (above) is reproduced in this paper as Figure 1. The Figure
shows that not all agencies achieved cost savings in 1998-99, but it appears that
some did.

20%
15%
10%

Cluster 3 CMO Realised
Savings

5%

Tender Projected Savings

0%
-5%

DIMA

AEC

DOFA

Small
agencies

Cluster

Key: “DIMA” is the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, “AEC” is the Australian Electoral
Commission, and “DOFA” is the Department of Finance and Administration (Minister Fahey’s department).

Figure 1. Cluster 3 Contract Management Office’s analysis of savings realized in
1998-99 compared to rate of savings projected for 1998-99 in tender evaluation.
(Source: Data from ANAO [2000], Figure 8.1, page 196)
Summarizing, both measuring cost savings, and actually achieving them, is
difficult. The examples above show that because of differences of opinion about
what should be measured and how it should be measured, there is unlikely to be
agreement on projected cost savings even on the date the tender is accepted.
Thereafter, conditions change, and controlling for the effect of these changes
makes it even harder to estimate cost savings. Measurement difficulties aside,
actually achieving cost savings is also difficult. Table 2 shows that even in a
competitive tendering situation, significant cost savings from IT Outsourcing
seemed likely in only one of four tenders. Clearly, despite the enormous effort
that went into the Australian Federal Government’s Initiative, cost savings do not
automatically flow from IT outsourcing.

This conclusion

was reached many

times before (e.g., Lacity and Willcocks 1998, 2000, 2001, and Seddon et al.
2001], but it is rare to see the conclusion backed by such explicit, audited figures.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Reading the various reports referenced in this paper it is clear that the Australian
Federal Government’s objectives in its IT Outsourcing Initiative were motivated
by the most laudable objectives. The government sought to achieve the best
value for money its information technology dollar and to support growth of
smaller Australian-owned IT service providers. To ensure success, it paid “top
dollar” to obtain advice from some of the world’s most respected and
experienced advisors, and at the most senior level, it tried its hardest to make the
project succeed. The novel aspect of the Initiative was the decision to cluster
departments to achieve economies of scale. A second key aspect of the Initiative
was the decision to impose IT outsourcing from above, often, it seems, against
the better judgment of senior management of the agencies and individual agency
staff.

So did the Initiative succeed? If the Initiative had been defined from the outset
as an experiment it could be classified as a success: experiments aim to achieve
learning, and an awful lot of learning took place. In particular, the government
learnt that because of increased coordination costs, clusters do not produce the
expected economies of scale for whole-of-IT outsourcing.

Secondly, the

government learnt that getting people on-side matters: all the way from senior
management to the lowliest Help Desk worker. Third, the government learnt
something that its advisors should already have known: that massive
organizational change such as making the transition from insourcing to total
outsourcing is hard. And finally, the government learnt that cost savings from
total outsourcing are both hard to achieve and hard to measure. Lessons 2, 3,
and 4 were learnt before, but somehow they had to be learnt again by both the
Australian government and all its high-paid advisors.
However, the Australian federal government did not view the Initiative as an
experiment; they simply wanted to acquire IT services more cheaply. From their
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perspective, the Initiative was a failure: centrally-coordinated clustered-agency IT
did not work as well as expected. Five of eleven planned contracts worth a total
of A$1.2 billion over five years are now let, and the agencies involved will have
to live with (or renegotiate) these contracts in the coming years.
How did the theory, the ten commandments presented in the Introduction, stand
up?

A case study cannot “prove” the truth of any theory but contradictory

evidence can raise serious doubt about the generality of a theory. In case of the
three outsourcing contracts investigated in this paper, none of the evidence
invalidates any of the commandments. Against the advice of Commandments 1
and 3, the government embarked on total IT outsourcing.
outsourcing was abandoned.

It failed. Total

Against the advice of Commandment 2, the

government sought to outsource all IT service provision rather than retain key IT
staff to manage relationships with vendors. This action placed enormous strain
on senior agency managers who, in the absence of qualified staff, were forced to
become involved in micro-level IT management issues. Against the advice of
Commandment 4, the government sought to impose IT outsourcing from above
rather than letting senior managers in the different agencies choose to outsource
services where they believed the economic case made sense. It was an article
of faith that private-sector IT service provision would be more efficient than
anything government public servants could provide. This action also failed.
Individual agencies are now given authority to exercise their own discretion on
which services are to be outsourced and which are not. These four high-level
decisions, and the underlying “privatization is good” ideology driving them, more
or less set the stage for all that followed.
EDITOR’S NOTE: This paper was fully peer reviewed. It was received on March 24, 2001 and
was published on May 10, 2001
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